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Abstract
This paper shows that the interpolation theorem fails in the intuitionis-
tic logic of constant domains. This result refutes two previously published
claims that the interpolation property holds.
1 Introduction
The main result of this paper demonstrates that the interpolation theorem fails
in the intuitionistic logic of constant domains. This shows that two previously
published proofs of the interpolation property are incorrect.
The model theory for the intuitionistic logic of constant domains (CD) was
proposed by Grzegorczyk in a paper [9] of 1964, inspired by Paul Cohen’s notion
of forcing, as well as the earlier semantics for intuitionistic logic proposed by
Evert W. Beth [1, 2]. The logic resulting from the semantics is stronger than
intuitionistic predicate logic, since it includes the scheme
(D) ∀x(A ∨B)→ (A ∨ ∀xB),
where x is not free in A; this scheme is not provable intuitionistically. Grze-
gorczyk proposed the semantics as a “philosophically plausible formal interpre-
tation of intuitionistic logic,” independently of the near-contemporary work of
Saul Kripke [11]. Grzegorczyk observes that his semantics validates the schema
(D), but goes on to propose a modification to the forcing relation for disjunc-
tions and existential formulas that gives an exact interpretation for intuitionistic
predicate logic.
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Sabine Go¨rnemann [8] proved that the addition of the scheme to intuitionistic
predicate logic is sufficient to axiomatize Grzegorczyk’s logic; D. Klemke [10]
and Dov Gabbay [5] gave independent proofs of the same result.
There are two published proofs that the interpolation theorem holds for the
intuitionistic logic of constant domains. The first is by Dov M. Gabbay [6], who
gives a model-theoretic proof. The second is by Lo´pez-Escobar [13], using proof
theory. In a later article [14], Lo´pez-Escobar admitted that there was an error
in his earlier proof of interpolation.
The first author of the present paper wrote in his review of [14] in the
Russian review journal ‘Mathematika’ [RZhmat], 7A70, July 1984: “The first
proof of the interpolation theorem for CD given by Dov Gabbay (reviewed in
RZhmat, 11A83, November 1971) contained gaps and specialists have different
opinions on whether these gaps were closed later. The proof from the previous
paper by the present author [L.-E.] (reviewed in RZhmat, 12A40, December
1981) consisted in essence of the reference to a cut-elimination theorem for
some Gentzen-type axiomatization for CD. In the paper under review its au-
thor reproduces a counterexample to this claim given by M. Fitting. (Another
counterexample was given by the present reviewer in RZhmat, 12A40, Decem-
ber 1981.) Therefore the question of the validity of the interpolation theorem
for CD is not clear. The present author [L.E.] tries to prove that CD does not
have any cut-free Gentzen-style axiomatization with a finite number of rules
where formulas are analyzed only up to a finite depth k. He concludes this from
the statement of necessity in such axiomatics of a derivable formula
∀x(p ∨B(x))→ (p ∨ (q → ∀x1 . . . xk−1∀xB(x)))
However this formula is derivable in the axiomatics obtained by adding the rule
p,Γ⇒ C ∀xBx,Γ⇒ C
∀x(p ∨Bx),Γ⇒ C
to ordinary intuitionistic rules. The error by the author is in the case C2 which
is not treated.”
In his paper of 1977, Gabbay shows that the strong Robinson consistency
theorem does not hold for CD; however, he goes on to claim that the weak
Robinson consistency theorem holds for CD, and from this deduces the in-
terpolation theorem. The first (negative) result appears in the comprehensive
monograph co-authored by Gabbay and Maksimova [7], but the proof of inter-
polation does not appear.
Our non-interpolation result can be used to justify the impression of E. G.
K. Lo´pez-Escobar in [13] that CD does not admit a “good” cut-free formula-
tion. Recall that one of the familiar proofs of interpolation for classical predi-
cate logic (say in [17]) goes by induction on a cut-free Gentzen-style derivation:
interpolants are defined for axioms, and simple prescriptions are given for trans-
ferring interpolants from premises of an inference to its conclusion. Hence our
result shows that CD does not admit a formulation where interpolants are de-
fined for axioms and there is an explicit definition of the interpolant for the
conclusion of every inference rule from interpolants for the premises of the rule.
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In fact this idea motivated the method by which the first author of the
present paper constructed the counterexample to interpolation treated below.
The implication Γ → ∆ lacking an interpolant was designed in such a way
that any obvious (to the author) proof of it would involve a cut over a formula
connecting predicates to be eliminated with the schema (D) above.
An important non-interpolation result was obtained in [4]. Kit Fine proved
there that any normal predicate modal logic with Barcan formula as an axiom
between K and S5 lacks interpolation. One can try to get our result from
this using the Go¨del-Tarski translation  of intuitionistic logic into S4 which
just prefixes the necessity symbol  to every subformula. The result F of
this translation is S4-valid (derivable) if and only if F is valid (derivable) intu-
itionistically. Moreover the translation is sound and faithful also for constant
domains, that is as an operation from CD into the modal predicate logic based
on S4 plus the Barcan formula. There are however essential obstacles blocking
an attempt to reduce the problem for CD to similar problem for modal systems.
First, counterexamples to interpolation used by Kit Fine do not translate in an
obvious way back from modal logic to intuitionistic logic or CD. Second, our
counterexample Γ→ ∆ does in fact have a modal interpolant. More about this
in the section 3. Third, Fine refutes not only Craig interpolation, but also Beth
definability theorem for his modal systems. It is not known at this moment
whether CD has the Beth property, although this does not look plausible.
A review of [4] by Saul Kripke [12] analyzed Fine’s construction in terms of
second order quantification of “redundant” variables and formed a background
for computations in our section 3.
The counterexample Γ→ ∆ to interpolation for CD given at the beginning
of that section was constructed by the first author at the beginning of 2008.
The third author joined the efforts to prove that no interpolant exists for the
example in 2011 and computed “first order equivalents” of ∃RΓ and ∀S∆ used
in our proof. (These results can be stated in a language recalling the language of
hybrid modal logic [3].) After that our efforts were stalled till the second author
arrived in Stanford and joined the project. This resulted in a construction of
models proving an interpolant for Γ ⇒ ∆ is indeed impossible based on his
characterization of first-order translations of intuitionistic formulas [16].
In Section 2 we recall the definition of CD and its model theory. In Section
3 we present our counterexample and compute “candidate interpolants” in the
first order language of Kripke-style models. Section 4 contains the definition of
asimulation (a generalization of bisimulation for modal logic) due to the second
author and proof of the easy part (necessity) of asimulation condition needed
for our result. Section 5 contains the construction of the pair of models proving
non-interpolation, and a detailed proof of the failure of interpolation for CD.
2 Model theory
We formulate the language L of the logicCD using the propositional connectives
∧, ∨, → and ⊥, together with the universal and existential quantifiers ∀ and
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∃; the negation operator ¬A is defined as A → ⊥. The atomic formulas are
of the form Px1, . . . , xk; we allow the case where the sequence of variables
x1, . . . , xk is empty, that is to say, where P is a propositional variable. We
use the notation A[x1, . . . , xk], or A[~x], for a formula of the language L, where
all the free variables in the formula appear in the sequence x1, . . . , xk (some of
the variables in the sequence may not appear in the formula). We employ the
notation L(P,Q) for the sublanguage of L in which the only predicate symbols
are the one-place predicates P and Q.
If D is a non-empty set, then the language L(D) is obtained from L by
adding a distinct constant a for every element a in D. If A[a1/x1, . . . , ak/xk] is
a sentence in the expanded language L(D), where A[x1, . . . , xk] is a formula of
L, then we define A[a1/x1, . . . , ak/xk] to be a theorem of CD if the universal
closure ∀x1 . . . ∀xkA[x1, . . . xk] is a theorem of CD.
Grzegorczyk’s model theory is very similar to that of Kripke [11], but sim-
pler. Kripke’s model theory involves a quasi-ordered set of classical models,
where the domains of the models can expand along the quasi-ordering. By
contrast, Grzegorczyk’s models have a fixed, constant domain. Thus the Grze-
gorczyk model theory represents a static ontology, whereas Kripke’s represents
an expanding ontology, where new objects can be created as knowledge grows.
A Grzegorczyk-model, or G-model for short, is a structure
M = 〈W,≤,w, D, φ〉,
where W is a non-empty set (the set of information states in the terminology of
Grzegorczyk), ≤ is a quasi-ordering onW (a reflexive transitive relation onW ),
w is the base state in the model satisfying ∀v ∈ W (w ≤ v), D is a non-empty
set, and for each k-ary predicate symbol P in L, φ(P ) is a k + 1-ary relation
contained in W ×Dk that satisfies the monotonicity condition
[v ≤ w ∧ 〈v, a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ φ(P )]⇒ 〈w, a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ φ(P ).
The forcing relation M holds between states in W and sentences in L(D) by
the following inductive definition:
1. v M Pa1, . . . , ak ⇔ 〈v, a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ φ(P ),
2. v M A ∧B ⇔ (v M A ∧ v M B),
3. v M A ∨B ⇔ (v M A ∨ v M B),
4. v M A→ B ⇔ ∀w ≥ v(w M A→ w M B),
5. v M ⊥ never holds,
6. v M ∃xA⇔ ∃a ∈ D(v M A[a/x]),
7. v M ∀xA⇔ ∀a ∈ D(v M A[a/x]).
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It is easy to verify that this semantics is sound for CD, in the sense that if v
is a state in a Grzegorczyk-model, and A a sentence of L(D) that is a theorem
of CD, then v M A. The completeness theorem for CD asserts that if A is
a sentence that is not a theorem of CD, then there is a Grzegorczyk-modelM
with base point v so that v 6M A.
The semantics is easily extended to a second-order version, where the second-
order variables of arity k range over k + 1-ary relations R over W × Dk that
satisfy a version of the monotonicity condition above:
[v ≤ w ∧ 〈v, a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ R]⇒ 〈w, a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ R.
We shall use the second-order semantics only in the one-quantifier form.
3 The Counterexample
In this section, we produce the counterexample used in refuting the interpolation
theorem for CD. The two formulas forming the antecedent and consequent of
the implication for which no interpolant exists in CD are as follows:
Γ = [∀x∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)) ∧ ¬∀xRx],
∆ = ∀x(Px→ (Qx ∨ S))→ S.
Lemma 3.1 The implication Γ→ ∆ is valid in all Grzegorczyk-models.
Proof. We give two proofs, the first model-theoretic, the second a deductive
proof in a sequent calculus.
First, we give a model-theoretic argument for the Lemma. Let v be a state in
a Grzegorczyk-modelM with domain D so that v M Γ; we wish to show that
v M ∆. Let w be a state inM so that v ≤ w, where w M ∀x(Px→ (Qx∨S)).
For an arbitrary a ∈ D, since v M Γ, w M ∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Ra)), so that
for some b ∈ D, w M Pb ∧ (Qb → Ra). We also have w M Pb → (Qb ∨ S),
hence w M (Qb ∨ S) and so w M Ra ∨ S. Since a was an arbitrary element
of D, it follows that w M ∀x(Rx∨S). Hence, by (D), w M ∀xRx∨S. Since
v M Γ, it follows that w M ¬∀xRx, so w M S, showing that v M ∆.
It follows by the completeness theorem for CD that Γ → ∆ is a theorem
of CD. However, we can argue directly for this in a multiple succedent sequent
calculus formulation of CD(see, e. g. [15]), using the notation A1 . . . An ⇒
B1 . . . Bm for sequents.
Employing the abbreviation
α :≡ ∀x(Px→ (Qx ∨ S)),
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we derive intuitionistically a nucleus of our implication.
(Qy → Rx), Qy ⇒ Rx ∨ S S ⇒ Rx ∨ S
(Qy → Rx), (Qy ∨ S)⇒ Rx ∨ S Py ⇒ Py
Py, (Qy → Rx), (Py → (Qy ∨ S))⇒ Rx ∨ S
(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)), (Py → (Qy ∨ S))⇒ Rx ∨ S
(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)), ∀x(Px→ (Qx ∨ S))⇒ Rx ∨ S
∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)), α⇒ Rx ∨ S
∀x∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)), α⇒ Rx ∨ S
∀x∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)), α⇒ ∀x(Rx ∨ S)
After that an application of the cut rule with an instance of the axiom D
produces the required result. We use the abbreviation
β := ∀x∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)).
...
β, α⇒ ∀x(Rx ∨ S)
∀xRx⇒ ∀xRx S ⇒ S
∀xRx ∨ S ⇒ ∀xRx, S
∀x(Rx ∨ S)⇒ ∀xRx, S
D,Cut
β, α⇒ ∀xRx, S
β,¬∀xRx, α ⇒ S
Γ, α⇒ S
Γ⇒ ∆

Corollary 3.1 The second-order implication ∃RΓ → ∀S∆ is valid in all G-
models.
It is possible to shed some further light on Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 3.1
through an analysis of the second-order sentences ∃RΓ and ∀S∆. In the fol-
lowing Lemma, we extract the content of these two sentences in the form of
semantical conditions on G-models.
Lemma 3.2 Let M be a G-model with base point v.
1. v M ∃RΓ if and only if M satisfies the semantical condition
I(P,Q) ≡ ∀w∃a(v M Pa ∧ w 6M Qa).
2. v M ∀S∆ if and only if M satisfies the semantical condition
J(P,Q) ≡ ∀w∃a(w M Pa ∧w 6M Qa).
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Proof. Part 1 (⇒). Assume that v M ∃RΓ; let w be an arbitrary state
in M. Then since v M ¬∀xRx, w 6M ∀xRx, so that for some b ∈ D,
w 6M Rb. Since v M Γ, v M ∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rb)), so that for some a ∈ D,
v M Pa ∧ (Qa → Rb). It follows that w 6M Qa, showing that M satisfies
I(P,Q).
Part 1 (⇐). Conversely, assume that M satisfies I(P,Q). Define E ⊆ D as
follows:
E := {a ∈ D | ∃w ∈ M(v M Pa ∧ w 6M Qa)}.
By assumption, E is non-empty. Let f be a surjective map from D to E, and
define for any a ∈ D, w ∈ W ,
w M Ra⇔ w M Q(f(a)).
Then for any a ∈ D, v M P (f(a)), and v M (Q(f(a)) ↔ Ra), so that
v M ∀x∃y(Py ∧ (Qy → Rx)). Furthermore, for any w ∈ M, there is a b ∈ E
so that v M Pb and w 6M Qb. Choose a ∈ D so that f(a) = b; we have
w M (Q(f(a)) ↔ Ra). Since w 6M Q(f(a)), w 6M Ra. This shows that
w 6M ∀xRx, so v M ¬∀xRx
Part 2 (⇐). Assume that M satisfies J(P,Q). If w is an arbitrary state in
M, where w M ∀x(Px→ (Qx∨S)), then by assumption, there is an a so that
w M Pa ∧ w 6M Qa. But w M (Pa→ (Qa ∨ S)), so S must be true at w.
Part 2 (⇒). For the converse, let us assume thatM does not satisfy J(P,Q).
Then there must be a w in M so that
∀a ∈ D(w M Pa⇒ w M Qa).
Now define S by setting u M S if and only if u > w; that is to say, the
proposition S holds exactly at those states accessible from w, but not identical
with w. We have to argue that w M ∀x(Px → (Qx ∨ S)). Let u be an
arbitrary state accessible from w. If u is w itself, we need to show that for any
a, whenever u M Pa, then u M (Qa ∨ S); this follows from our assumption.
On the other hand, if u is not w, then S holds at u, by construction, so (Qa∨S)
holds for any a. So, we’ve shown that for any a, w M (Pa → (Qa ∨ S)),
hence w M ∀x(Px → (Qx ∨ S)). However, S fails at w, by construction, so
v 6M ∀S∆. 
In notation of Lemma 3.2 note that J(P,Q) is true in all models of S4+BF
(quantified S4 plus the Barcan formula) if and only if
S4 +BF |= ∃x(Px ∧ ¬Qx).
Hence the implication Γ ⇒ ∆ has a modal interpolant. Theorem 5.1 below
shows that this modal formula is not equivalent to a Go¨del-Tarski translation
(prefixing  to all subformulas) of any intuitionistic formula.
Lemma 3.2 suggests a strategy to demonstrate the failure of the interpolation
theorem, namely by showing that if Θ(v) is a first-order property of G-models
that is implied by I(P,Q), and also implies J(P,Q), then it cannot be expressed
by a formula of CD involving only the predicates P and Q.
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4 Asimulations
In this section, we introduce the basic concept of CD-asimulation, an asym-
metric counterpart of the concept of bisimulation familiar from the literature
of modal logic [3, Chapter 2]. The definition given below can be considered as
a more general version of the notion of bisimulation for modal predicate logic
defined by Johan van Benthem [18].
Definition 4.1 IfM1 = 〈W1,≤1,v, D1, φ1〉 andM2 = 〈W2,≤2,w, D2, φ2〉 are
G-models, then a CD-asimulation betweenM1 andM2 is a relation Z satisfying
the following conditions:
1. Z ⊆
⋃
k≥0[(W1 ×D
k
1
)× (W2 ×Dk2 )] ∪ [(W2 ×D
k
2
)× (W1 ×Dk1 )];
2. {(v, ~dZw,~e) ∧ v i P [~d]} ⇒ w j P [~e], for P [~x] an atomic formula;
3. {(t, ~dZu,~e) ∧ u ≤j v} ⇒ (∃w ∈Wi)(t ≤i w ∧ (w, ~dZv,~e) ∧ (v, ~eZw, ~d));
4. {t ∈Wi ∧ (t, ~dZu,~e) ∧ f ∈ Di} ⇒ (∃g ∈ Dj)(t, ~d, fZu,~e, g);
5. {t ∈Wi ∧ (t, ~dZu,~e) ∧ g ∈ Dj} ⇒ (∃f ∈ Di)(t, ~d, fZu,~e, g),
where {i, j} = {1, 2}, and i and j are the forcing relations in Mi and Mj.
The concept of asimulation is due to the second author of this paper. The
version we are using here is a simplified version of the general notion; the sim-
plifications are possible because we are operating in the context of the constant
domain semantics. The second author has defined a more general version [16]
that is suited to the context of Kripke’s semantics for intuitionistic predicate
logic, and has also proved that it serves to characterize the first-order properties
expressed by formulas of propositional and predicate logic in that framework.
In the present case, however, we do not need the full characterization theorems;
the following Lemma is sufficient for our purpose of refuting the interpolation
theorem for the logic CD.
Lemma 4.1 Let Z be a CD-asimulation between M1 and M2, and A[~x] a
formula of L. If t, ~dZu,~e and t i A[~d], then u j A[~e], where {i, j} = {1, 2}.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the formula A[~x]. For atomic
formulas, the lemma holds by the definition of CD-asimulation. The inductive
steps for ∧, ∨ and ⊥ are straightforward.
Now assume that t, ~dZu,~e and that t i A[~d] → B[~d]. If u ≤j v and
v j A[~e], then by the third condition in Definition 4.1,
(∃w ∈ Wi)(t ≤i w ∧ (w, ~dZv,~e) ∧ (v, ~eZw, ~d)).
By inductive assumption, w i A[~d], so that w i B[~d], since t i A[~d]→ B[~d].
Again, by inductive assumption, v j B[~e], showing that u j A[~e]→ B[~e].
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Assume that t, ~dZu,~e and that t i ∃xA[~d, x]. Then t i A[~d, f ], for some
f ∈ Di. By the fourth condition in Definition 4.1, there is a g in Dj so that
t, ~d, fZu,~e, g. By inductive assumption, u j A[~e,g], so that u j ∃xA[~e, x].
Assume that t, ~dZu,~e and that t i ∀xA[~d, x]. Let g be an arbitrary indi-
vidual in Dj. By the fifth condition in Definition 4.1, (∃f ∈ Di)(t, ~d, fZu,~e, g).
Then t i A[~d, f ], so by inductive assumption, u j A[~e,g], showing that
u j ∀xA[~e, x]. 
5 Refuting interpolation
In this section, we define two G-models, M1 and M2, together with a CD-
asimulation between them (these definitions and the ideas of the proofs given
below are due to the second author of this paper). This will enable us to carry
out the strategy outlined in the comments following Lemma 3.2. The states in
both models are quasi-partitions, given by the following definition. We use the
notation N for the set of positive natural numbers, and for k > 0, l ≥ 0, we
write kN+ l for the set {kn+ l|n ∈ N}, and kN for kN+ 0.
Definition 5.1 1. A quasi-partition (A,B,C) is defined by the following
conditions:
(a) A ∪B ∪ C = N;
(b) A,B,C are pairwise disjoint;
(c) A and C are infinite;
(d) B is either empty or infinite.
2. A quasi-order E on the set of all quasi-partitions is defined by
(A,B,C) E (D,E, F )⇔ [A ⊆ D ∧ F ⊆ C].
We begin by defining two quasi-partitions that will serve as the base points
of our two models. The first is v = (v1,v2,v3) = (3N, 3N + 1, 3N + 2); the
second is w = (w1,w2,w3) = (2N, ∅, 2N+ 1).
Definition 5.2 M1 and M2 are of the form M = 〈W,≤,u, D, φ〉; they are
defined as follows.
1. The base points for M1 and M2 are v and w respectively;
2. The set of states for the models are as follows.
(a) W1 = {(A,B,C)| v E (A,B,C), where B ∩ v2 is infinite};
(b) W2 = {(A,B,C)|w E (A,B,C), where B 6= ∅} ∪ {w};
3. The ordering on both M1 and M2 is E;
4. D1 = D2 = N;
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5. For i = 1, 2, the values φi assigned to the predicate symbols P and Q are
defined by
φi(P ) = {〈v, a〉|a ∈ v1 ∪ v2},
φi(Q) = {〈v, a〉|a ∈ v1}.
The relationE is clearly reflexive and transitive. Furthermore, if (A,B,C) E
(D,E, F ), then because F ⊆ C, A ∪ B ⊆ D ∪ E. In addition, A ⊆ D, so that
φi satisfies the monotonicity property. Hence, bothM1 andM2 are G-models.
Lemma 5.1 1. The G-model M1 satisfies the condition I(P,Q);
2. The condition J(P,Q) fails in the G-model M2.
Proof. For the first part of the lemma, let u = (A,B,C) be a state in W1,
and v the base point ofM1. By definition, B∩v2 is infinite. Choose k ∈ B∩v2.
Then v 1 Pk and u 61 Qk, showing that I(P,Q) holds in M1.
For the second part of the lemma, at the base point w of the G-model M2,
we have ∀a ∈ D2(w 2 Pa⇒ w 2 Qa), because w2 = ∅. Hence, the condition
J(P,Q) fails in the model M2. 
We next need to define a CD-asimulation Z between the G-models M1 and
M2. The following notations are useful in stating the definition of Z and in
demonstrating its properties. If ~u is a sequence of elements from a set D, then
D r ~u is the result of removing all of the elements of ~u from D. For ~d,~e ∈ Nk,
S ⊆ N we denote by [~d 7→ ~e] the binary relation {〈dl, el〉 | 1 ≤ l ≤ k} and by
[~d 7→ ~e]−1(S) the set {dl | el ∈ S, 1 ≤ l ≤ k}.
Because sequences ~d,~e ∈ Nk may contain repetitions, the relation [~d 7→ ~e]
may not be a bijection, and in fact, may not even be a function. However, if ~d
and ~e have the same pattern of repetitions (for example, if ~d = 1, 1, 2, 3, 2 and
~e = 4, 4, 5, 6, 5) then [~d 7→ ~e] is a bijection, as is required in the next definition.
Definition 5.3 Relative to the models M1 andM2 given in Definition 5.2, the
relation Z is defined as follows:
1. Z ⊆
⋃
k≥0[(W1 ×D
k
1
)× (W2 ×Dk2 )] ∪ [(W2 ×D
k
2
)× (W1 ×Dk1 )];
2. 〈(A,B,C), ~d〉 Z 〈(D,E, F ), ~e〉, where ~d ∈ Dki , ~e ∈ D
k
j , {i, j} = {1, 2}, if
and only if the following conditions hold:
(a) Relation [~d 7→ ~e] is a bijection.
(b) If 1 ≤ l ≤ k and dl ∈ A then el ∈ D;
(c) If 1 ≤ l ≤ k and dl ∈ B, then el ∈ D ∪ E.
It is easy to see that in the case when both 〈(A,B,C), ~d〉 Z 〈(D,E, F ), ~e〉
and 〈(D,E, F ), ~e〉Z 〈(A,B,C), ~d〉 hold, conditions 2(b),(c) of this definition are
equivalent, modulo other restrictions, to the following ones:
dl ∈ A iff el ∈ D;
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dl ∈ B iff el ∈ E,
for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
Lemma 5.2 The relation Z in Definition 5.3 is a CD-asimulation between the
G-models M1 and M2.
Proof. The first condition in Definition 4.1 is true by definition. For the
second condition, assume that v, ~dZw,~e and that v i P [~d], where P (xl) is
atomic, ~d ∈ Dki , and 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Thus we have v i P [d], where d = dl, so that
d ∈ v1 ∪ v2; it follows that e = el ∈ w1 ∪ w2, by Definition 5.3, showing that
v j P [~e]. The proof for atomic formulas Q(xl) is similar.
For the third condition in Definition 4.1, assume that t, ~dZu,~e, where t =
(A,B,C), u = (D,E, F ), and u ≤j v, v = (G,H, I). By definition, u E v. Two
cases arise here: B is infinite, or B = ∅.
In the first case, define w = (J,K,L) as follows:
J = (Ar ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G);
K = (B r ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H);
L = (C r ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(I).
We need to show that (J,K,L) is indeed a successor of (A,B,C) in Mi, i.e.
that (A,B,C) E (J,K,L) and that if B ∩ v2 is infinite, then so is K ∩ v2. For
the latter claim note that if B∩v2 is infinite, then so is (Br ~d)∩v2, given that
~d is finite. But since, according to our definition of K we have (B r ~d) ⊆ K,
K ∩ v2 must be infinite, too, showing that (J,K,L) is a quasi-partition in Mi.
The former claim, that is to say, the claim that A ⊆ J and L ⊆ C, can
be verified as follows. If a ∈ A, and a is in ~d, say a = dl, then el ∈ D,
so el ∈ G, from which it follows that dl = a ∈ J . Since I ⊆ F , we have
[~d 7→ ~e]−1(I) ⊆ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(F ) ⊆ C, showing that L ⊆ C. Finally, it follows by
construction that for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, dl ∈ J ⇔ el ∈ G, and dl ∈ K ⇔ el ∈ H . Hence,
w, ~dZv,~e and v, ~eZw, ~d, completing the proof of the third condition in the first
case.
In the second case, where B = ∅, we have (A,B,C) = w = (2N, ∅, 2N+ 1).
In this case, we partition C r ~d into two disjoint infinite sets C1 and C2, and
define w = (J,K,L) as follows:
J = (Ar ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G);
K = C1 ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]
−1(H);
L = C2 ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]
−1(I).
Then J,K,L are all infinite by construction. The remainder of the proof of the
third condition in the second case is essentially the same as for the first case,
the only difference being that in this case we do not need to establish that if
B ∩ v2 is infinite, then so is K ∩ v2.
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For the fourth condition in Definition 4.1, assume that t ∈ Wi, (t, ~dZu,~e),
where t = (G,H, I), u = (J,K,L), and f ∈ Di. If f = dl for some 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
then set g := el. Otherwise, given that f /∈ ~d, choose g ∈ Dj so that g ∈ J r ~e
(this is possible because J is infinite). Thus we have shown the existence of a g
so that t, ~d, fZu,~e, g.
The fifth condition is proved by a similar argument. Namely, assume that
t ∈Wi, (t, ~dZu,~e), where t = (G,H, I), u = (J,K,L), and g ∈ Dj . If g = el for
some 1 ≤ l ≤ k, then set f := dl. Otherwise, since g /∈ ~e, choose f ∈ Di so that
g ∈ I r ~d (this is possible because I is infinite). 
We now have all the material required to refute interpolation for CD.
Theorem 5.1 The implication Γ → ∆ is valid in all Grzegorczyk-models, but
has no interpolant in CD.
Proof. The validity of the implication is proved in Lemma 3.1. Now let
us assume that the implication has an interpolant in CD, that is to say, a
sentence Θ in the language L(P,Q) so that both Γ → Θ and Θ → ∆ are valid
in all G-models. Then Θ is also an interpolant for the second-order implication
∃RΓ→ ∀S∆.
Since the G-modelM1 satisfies the condition I(P,Q), by Lemma 5.1, its base
point also satisfies the second-order condition ∃RΓ, by Lemma 3.2, so v 1 Θ.
Moreover, it is clear from Definition 5.3 that we have 〈v,Λ〉Z 〈w,Λ〉, where Λ is
the empty sequence. Lemma 5.2 shows that Z is a CD-asimulation betweenM1
and M2, so by Lemma 4.1, w 2 Θ, hence w 2 ∀S∆. However, Lemma 3.2
shows that M2 must satisfy J(P,Q), contradicting Lemma 5.1. Consequently,
no such interpolant for the implication Γ→ ∆ can exist. 
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